in the beginning they made some changes and radicalized the US foreign
policy to raise some eyebrows, Neocons in the US had critics from the
very outset. One of their biggest critics is Francis Fukuyama.
a key Reagan Administration contributor to the formulation of the
Reagan Doctrine, Fukuyama is an important figure in the rise of
neoconservatism, although his works came out years after Irving
Kristol's 1972 book crystallized neoconservatism. Fukuyama was active in
the Project for the New American Century think tank starting in 1997,
and as a member co-signed the organization's 1998 letter recommending
that President Bill Clinton support Iraqi insurgencies in the overthrow
of then-President of Iraq Saddam Hussein. He was also among forty
co-signers of William Kristol's September 20, 2001 letter to President
George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 attacks that suggested the
U.S. not only "capture or kill Osama bin Laden", but also embark upon "a
determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq".
Fukuyama declared he would not be voting for Bush, and that the Bush administration had made three mistakes, including misjudging what was needed to bring peace in Iraq and being overly optimistic about the success with which social engineering of western values could be applied to Iraq and the Middle East in general.
Fukuyama considers threat, risk, and preventive war during the Bush administration as the main building blocks of American leaders. He considered lack of legitimacy of attack on Iraq before the public mind as well as some serious opposition inside the US government as two big challenges that president Bush faced as he set out for the invasion of Iraq.
Fukuyama believes that American people are against plans which require spending money outside of the state, and which lack immediate, tangible interests for them. He believes that by freeing a country from a dictator, neocons opened the way for sectarian, ethnic, and other violent formations to grow, as well as domestic conflict.
Neocons have always showed a tendency to agitate others to accompany them on war on terror, so that they exempt themselves of allegations of unilateral decision making. War on terror is the most outstanding rhetoric of neocons in the US, on which they have so far staged most of their policies vis a vis the Middle East. The most noticeable excuse they used in their media campaign to justify the military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was to link Saddam Hussein to the terrorist group al-Qaeda. But later, in 2007 when a report of the Central Intelligence Agency, it was made clear that the neocon’s strategy on the war on terrorism, especially in fighting al-Qaeda, had no befitting outcome.
Like their interpretations of democracy, reformism, and free elections, the neocon’s policy for fighting terrorism was selective and politically unilateral. Despite official statements by governments of Iraq and Afghanistan which consider the House of Saudi, Jordan, Syria, and Pakistan as the real driving forces behind terrorist groups in their countries, US neocons chose to keep silent against terrorism in Iraq as a means to support governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
After the 9/11 events and US military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the unilateral tendencies of neocons interpreted the entire social and governmental maxims in a way to serve the objectives of their foreign policy.
In such military and security atmosphere, where psychological operations had been wrought out to prepare the public mind and agitate the nation, the country’s overt and covert crises that really mattered were forgotten. Enjoying the illusion of leadership in the age of information, the US blew the trumpet for being the savior and unquestionable leader of attempts to wipe the world of extremism and violence. Kissinger in one of his books wrote that as the US leaders adopted that strategy, the stance of the United States in the international arena plunged drastically, noting that everywhere the US is in war with others.
The US attacked Afghanistan and Iraq through unilateral decisions and in a bid to spread its sway over the region and establish the hegemony that it wanted. It used to predict that by succeeding in these two locations, it would open the way for next plans in the region as well as the world. It thought it would isolate a non-abiding country, that is, the Islamic Republic of Iran, to create grounds for a full grip on the region, a region full of energy resources and was a birthplace for anti-West ideologies.
The actions of the US and its allies, most so the Zionist regime of Israel, in the region show its inclination to spread its hegemony over the international arena, especially to establish the hegemony as a blanket to cover the whole Middle East area. But it seems that by disregarding international norms and through the use of military power, aggravated by economic problems, the US has by degrees lost what it takes to become a hegemonic power.
As its interests in the Middle East grew larger, the US wiped out two tough rivals of Iran, that is, Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party in Iraq. It also seems that the US has been grounded in these two countries. Although after these changes the US has come to reside next to Iran, it has by same degrees grown vulnerable, due to the vast areas in the region where it has established its presence. In both countries of Iraq and Afghanistan groups have risen to power which are more in line with the Islamic Republic. Also, the role of Iran in regional developments, especially regarding Iraq has increased in intensity and effectiveness.
Also, the US force behind the case of Palestine and Lebanon has had two outcomes: one, it has weakened the compromise-minded current due to a one sided support for the Israel regime. And two, it has empowered and emboldened the resistance current by depriving it of its real stance and the role it could legally play.